University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1985

On Preferences and Promises: A Response to
Harsanyi
Donald H. Regan
University of Michigan Law School, donregan@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/745

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Law and Philosophy Commons
Recommended Citation
Regan, Donald H. "On Preferences and Promises: A Response to Harsanyi." Ethics 96, no. 1 (1985): 56-67.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

On Preferences and Promises:
A Response to Harsanyi
Donald Regan
John C. Harsanyi sketches an entire normative and metaethical theory
in under twenty pages.' Combining breadth and brevity, his essay is
useful and interesting. It reveals the interrelations between Harsanyi's
positions on various issues as no longer work or series of articles could
do. But by virtue of its programmatic nature, the essay creates a dilemma
for a commentator, at least for one who finds many things to disagree
with. If I responded to Harsanyi in the same sweeping terms in which
he argues, we would end up with little more than opposing assertions.
At the other extreme, I could point out what seem to me particular
defects in Harsanyi's arguments as they stand. But that would seem
pedantic and ungenerous if my particular objections could be avoided
by spelling out his arguments at greater length, as some of them surely
could. (I am especially troubled by this possibility because I am persuaded
that in the past I once misinterpreted an argument of Harsanyi's and
treated it unjustly.)2 Constraints of space prevent me from first spelling
out Harsanyi's arguments as best I can and then criticizing them.
Accordingly, I shall limit myself to two topics, chosen partly because
I think the observations I shall make are worth making whether or not
they represent points of ineliminable disagreement between Harsanyi
and myself.
I
Assuming that the basic point of morality is to bring it about that people's
preferences are satisfied, Harsanyi says that "we cannot always use a
person's observable preferences as our final criterion for his or her true
interests" (p. 43). Rather, we should concern ourselves with people's true
preferences, that is, with what they would prefer if they were fully informed
and perfectly logical.
It is important to ask at this point just what sort of preferences
Harsanyi is willing to dismiss as misguided. Is he taking the sort of
1. John C. Harsanyi, "Does Reason Tell Us What Moral Code to Follow and, Indeed,
to Follow Any Moral Code at All?" in this issue; further citations to this essay will be in
parentheses in the text.
2. See below, A Coda on Coordination.
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position Richard Brandt takes?3 Is he willing to throw out even such a
fundamental preference as some adult's desire for artistic achievement,
if, say, it can be shown that this preference was acquired as a result of
childhood misperceptions about the means of or the importance of pleasing
one's parents? Or is Harsanyi thinking only of instrumental preferences
such as Jones's observable desire to go to Chicago, which is misguided
because the reason Jones wants to go is to see his friend Brown, and
Brown, unbeknownst to Jones, has moved to Los Angeles?
If Harsanyi contemplates ignoring as misguided only instrumental
preferences, like Jones's desire to go to Chicago, then much of what I
have to say will be irrelevant; but by the same token, his theory will be
much less ambitious than it might seem, and it will require us to maximize
the satisfaction of people's ultimate preferences, whatever they are and
however much they may be historically based on ignorance, illogic, or
psychological domination.
If, on the other hand, Harsanyi means, like Brandt, to subject even
ultimate preferences to criticism by facts and logic-if he means to suggest
that what is in a person's interest depends on what she would prefer
I want to ask, Why?
after a course of cognitive psychotherapy-then
Why should we try to promote the satisfaction of people's "true"ultimate
preferences, which are or may very well be hypothetical, instead of their
observable ultimate preferences, which are actual? (Hereafter, whenever
I speak of "preferences," I shall mean ultimate preferences.)
The question may seem an odd one. My purpose in asking the
question is not to cast doubt on the importance of what distinguishes
true preferences from observable preferences. I agree that it is desirable
to be as well-informed as possible and to think logically in deliberating
about practical questions. My purpose is rather to cast doubt on the
ability of someone like Harsanyi, who takes the satisfaction of preferences
as the fundamental nonmoral good, to account for the importance of
particular to explain why ininformation, logic, and deliberation-in
formation, logic, and deliberation matter in the formation of (ultimate)
preferences, as opposed to the attempt to satisfy them.
To begin with, the only (ultimate) preferences I actually have are
my observable preferences, not my true preferences if those are different.
If my true preferences and my observable preferences diverge, what is
the good to me of the occurrence of events that satisfy my true preferences
but that disappoint my actual desires?
Faced with this question, Harsanyi might retreat one step. He might
agree that, if a choice must be made between satisfying some agent's
observable preferences and satisfying her true preferences, then it is her
observable preferences that matter. But, he might add, the agent would
be well-advised to deliberate about her preferences, or to get assistance
3. Richard B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1979), esp. chap. 6.
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in deliberation in the form of cognitive psychotherapy, so as to bring
her observable preferences as nearly into line with her true preferences
as possible. But again, Why?
The obvious answer is something along these lines: many of our
preferences are misguided. They were encouraged historically by factual
error, or they are the result of false ideals and inappropriate guilt feelings
(or the like) acquired when we were under the sway of our parents. We
have desires for things that give us no actual pleasure when we get them.
And we have aversions to things that, if we were better informed or
psychologically healthier, we would greatly enjoy. Deliberation will allow
us to rid ourselves of these impediments to genuine happiness.
There are two problems with this answer. For one thing, it is by no
means a necessary truth that we will enjoy life more if we discover and
act on our true preferences. For example, it may turn out that our true
preferences are harder to satisfy than our observable ones. Deliberation
may destroy preferences we can satisfy (and the satisfaction of which
would in fact give us pleasure) and replace them with preferences we
cannot satisfy, condemning us to frustration.
Furthermore, the argument in favor of deliberation that I have
suggested presupposes that the real good is not the satisfaction of our
preferences, whether observable preferences or true preferences, but
rather is the psychological enjoyment that, if we are fortunate, the satisfaction of our preferences produces. In other words, the argument for
the superiority of true preferences presupposes that the real good is not
preference satisfaction at all but is a particular sort of psychological
experience. But it was precisely the inadequacy of a theory that posits
only psychological experiences as the good that led philosophers to assert
that the good was the satisfaction of preferences in the first place. If we
abandon the psychological-experience theory of the good in favor of the
preference-satisfaction theory, we cannot then turn around and use the
quality of experience produced as the test for which preferences to satisfy.
In sum, deliberation about one's ultimate preferences is desirableeven, I should say, morally required-but the theorist who takes preference
satisfaction as the fundamental good has no satisfactory explanation of
why.
II
I turn now to a different topic, the relative merits of rule utilitarianism
and act utilitarianism. One of Harsanyi's charges against act utilitarianism
is that act utilitarians are unable to maintain many socially useful practices,
most particularly practices like promising, which involve the creation of
expectations (sec. 2).4 I think Harsanyi is mistaken about this; act utilitarians
4. Harsanyi distinguishes between an expectation effect and an incentive effect of
practices like promising. The former has to do with the degree to which people can form
beliefs and feel secure and confident about what will happen in their future. The latter
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can have a practice of promising. (Promising is the only practice I shall
discuss, but I believe most proponents of act utilitarianism and many
opponents would agree that promising can be taken as representative of
a considerable range of similar practices.)
In my opinion, the issue of whether act utilitarians can influence
expectations through a practice of promising is more complicated than
Harsanyi makes it appear. I have discussed the matter at some length
elsewhere, and I cannot discuss it fully here.5 What I can do here, without
repeating anything I have said elsewhere, is to suggest that Harsanyi
misrepresents the institution of promising, not only as it would function
among act utilitarians, but even as it functions in commonsense morality.
In criticizing Harsanyi on these lines, I am not criticizing him alone. His
view of how promising works is widespread among philosophers.
Imagine two friends, Damon and Pythias, who live in the same town
and who see each other regularly. Damon and Pythias agree on Friday
to meet for lunch the following Monday at their favorite Greek restaurant.
Monday morning arrives, and Damon gets up late with a hangover. Not
a terrible hangover, but enough of a hangover to make the prospect of
the planned luncheon distinctly unappealing. Damon tries to telephone
Pythias, without success. After brief reflection, he goes back to bed. He
is breaking his promise, but he believes that he is justified in doing so
under the circumstances.
Is Damon justified? I think he is, and I suggest that any commonsense
moralist who was not engaged in writing a philosophical discourse on
promising would agree with me. So, I believe, would Pythias. Most philosophers, however, write as if promises could be broken only when the
costs of keeping them would be very great, and by that standard Damon
would not be entitled to break his promise. Watching others eat while
you have a headache, mild nausea, and no appetite for food is a hardship,
but it is not "very great."
What would Harsanyi think about Damon's promise breaking? I take
it there is no doubt that Damon and Pythias's agreement counts as an
exchange of promises, whether or not they used the words "I promise."
Harsanyi mentions agreements to meet one's friends at specified times
and places as an example of the use of promising (sec. 2), and it is
universally acknowledged that no particular form of words is necessary
to making a promise.
Harsanyi says that commonsense morality allows a promisor to break
his promise "only in some rare and rather exceptional cases where keeping
has to do with the degree to which people are willing to act on the basis of their expectations
about how others will behave. See Harsanyi, sec. 2, andJohn C. Harsanyi, "Rule Utilitarianism
and Decision Theory," Erkenntnis 11 (1977): 25-53, pp. 36-37. Since the incentive effect
depends on the formation of expectations, I shall generally subsume both effects under
the general rubric of expectations. I think there is only one point in my argument at which
this conflation might matter (see n. 7 below).
5. Donald H. Regan, Utilitarianismand Co-operation(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
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his promise would cause him or some other people extreme hardship,
or where the promisee would suffer only a very minor loss if the promise
made to him were not fulfilled" (p. 44). Certainly Damon's meeting
Pythias as agreed would not impose extreme hardship. So the issue becomes
whether Pythias will suffer "only a very minor loss" if Damon does not
turn up. If the loss to Pythias is too large to count as "very minor," then
on Harsanyi's test Damon would have to keep his promise; and if I am
right that commonsense morality would allow Damon to break the promise,
then Harsanyi's test would not capture the commonsense view. So it
seems that the loss to Pythias here must count as very minor. But if this
is a very minor loss, there will be many cases in which promisors are
allowed to break their promises on the ground that the loss to the promisee
will be very minor. And that is inconsistent with Harsanyi's claim that
commonsense morality allows promises to be broken only in "some rare
and rather exceptional cases."
It may seem that Harsanyi could avoid my present criticism by complicating his test just a bit. Instead of stating two excusing conditions in
the alternative, one of which looks to the hardship to the promisor (or
other people) and the other of which looks to the loss to the promise,
perhaps the test should require that the hardship to the promisor (or
others) and the loss to the promisee be considered together and balanced
against each other by some mechanism that embodies a presumption in
favor of keeping the promise.
Certainly such a test would come closer to capturing commonsense
promising, but it would not make Harsanyi's general view of promising
tenable. The problem with his view is not that he fails to state a test that
is perfect in detail. No one could do that. The problem, which came out
in the last step of my discussion of his test as he states it, is his claim that
commonsense morality allows promises to be broken only rarely. This,
I think, isjust not true. If I am right, then no test can capture commonsense
promising which makes cases of justified promise breaking rare and
exceptional.
Like most philosophers who write about promising, Harsanyi overlooks
the fact that commonsense promising is a subtle and flexible practice.
Some promises are more important than others. Some promises are
meant by the parties to be taken more seriously than others. We cannot
state necessary and sufficient excusing conditions in terms of a specific
level of hardship to the promisor or a specific level of loss to the promisee.
Promising does not work that way. (Although I have discussed only one
example, it should suggest a host of others to the reader.) Furthermore,
it is the act utilitarian who is best able to give a philosophical account of
the subtleties of promising because it is the act utilitarian who is most
sensitive to the importance of circumstances.6
6. Let me mention one other striking example of an overlooked subtlety in commonsense
promising (recognizing that doing so takes me beyond the topics Harsanyi discusses). As
I noted above, it is universally acknowledged that no particular form of words is necessary
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Have I put too much weight on promises between friends or acquaintances? What about promises made in impersonal, commercial dealings? Surely those promises can be broken only rarely. I shall return to
this point-I mention it now lest the reader become too impatient. But
before I discuss it, there is more I want to say about Damon and Pythias.
It might seem that if act utilitarianism (or commonsense morality
for that matter) were as permissive as I say about promise breaking, then
act utilitarians (or commonsense moralists) would not be able to rely on
each other's undertakings. I believe they can rely on each other. Imagine
that Damon and Pythias are both act utilitarians. On Friday, they make
their date for lunch on Monday. Each believes on Friday that, barring
unforeseen developments, their meeting for lunch on Monday will be
the best available pattern ofjoint behavior. (From this it follows, incidentally,
that each believes on Friday that, barring unforeseen developments, the
best thing for him to do on Monday, if the other keeps the date, will be
to keep it also.) Now, Monday arrives. Can Pythias rely on Damon to
turn up for lunch? Of course he can. To see this, it is only necessary to
be clear about the relevant sense of "reliance."
If the question is whether Pythias can regard Damon's appearance
as a cast-iron certainty, the answer is no. If the question is whether Pythias
can assume that Damon will appear with a probability of 99 percent (or
whatever probability would be guaranteed by most philosophers' overstringent account of commonsense promising), the answer is still no. But
these are questions of little importance. The most important question is
whether Pythias can reasonably assume that he ought to go to the restaurant
himself. Pythias's going, in the expectation of meeting Damon, would
constitute reliance on Damon's undertaking in one standard sense of
"reliance," and this is the sense of reliance that matters most.
Should Pythias go? The obvious answer is yes. In order for it to be
reasonable for Pythias to go, he does not have to know that Damon will
certainly turn up, nor even that Damon will turn up with a probability
of 99 percent. If the agreement was a sensible one when made on Friday,
then in all likelihood Pythias should keep it as long as the probability of
Damon's keeping it is, say, 50 percent or even somewhat less. We cannot
be precise without more assumptions, but the point is clear: even if
Damon will regard himself as excused by a minor hardship like his hangover, and even if Pythias knows that, the probability that Damon will
turn up is still far greater than the minimum probability necessary to
for making a promise. Specifically, the words "I promise" are not necessary. But it does
not follow at all that the precise words used are unimportant. In fact, use of the specific
words "I promise" (or any of a few very close equivalents), while not necessary to the
creation of a promise, normally increases the binding force of a promise. Use of those
words constitutes an explicit acknowledgment by the promisor of the special importance
to the promisee of this particular undertaking. There are many everyday contexts in which
promises are made but in which use of the words "I promise," out of the blue, would be
distinctly odd. Once we start thinking about just what words we use to make promises,
and when and why, the nuances are legion.
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justify Pythias in going to the restaurant-that is, to justify Pythias in
"relying" in the sense that counts.7
There is still a puzzle here. I say that Pythias should keep the date
if there is at least a 50 percent chance (roughly) that Damon will keep
it. But on what ground do we expect Damon to keep the date with even
that probability? Well, Damon will keep the date (probably) because he
expects Pythias to appear. But that is true only because Damon expects
Pythias to expect that he, Damon, will appear. And so on. We may wonder
whether these mutual expectations can be reciprocally justifying, as it
seems they must be for the agreement to work. As I say, this is a puzzle,
but someone who argued on the basis of this puzzle that agreements
between act utilitarians could not work would not be making the same
objection that Harsanyi makes. Harsanyi's claim is apparently just that
the act utilitarian promisor would be excused too often for it to be rational
for the promisee to rely. I have argued that that is not necessarily true.
If we accept the point I have made in response to Harsanyi's specific
claim, then we can see that there may be two different equilibrium sets
of mutual expectations between Damon and Pythias. If they have made
no agreement, each one expects the other to turn up at the Greek restaurant
on Monday with only whatever probability is suggested by that other's
normal dispositions with regard to independent choices about where to
eat. We can assume that in such a case Pythias does not expect Damon
to go to the restaurant with enough probability so that it makes sense
for Pythias to go there unless he independently feels like it. And vice
versa. If, on the other hand, they have made an agreement, Pythias can
expect Damon to go to the restaurant with a substantially higher probability
than in the absence of the agreement (and vice versa), and this can be
true despite the fact that each understands the other will not go to the
restaurant if some unforeseen event makes going even a minor hardship.
So, it can be rational for Pythias (for example) to go, barring an unforeseen
event creating hardship for himself, in the expectation of meeting Damon,
even though Pythias knows Damon will regard himself as excused by an
intervening occurrence that makes it better on balance that he (Damon)
not go given the postagreementlevel of probability that Pythias will go. In
short, there are, as I have said, two different possible equilibria of (actutilitarian) expectations. (There might be more than two, but that does
not matter for now.) The puzzle mentioned at the beginning of this long
7. This is the point at which it might be important not to conflate the incentive effect
and the expectation effect (see n. 4 above). Strictly speaking, what I argue for in the text
is that Pythias will have sufficiently strong expectations to give him an adequate incentive
to go to the restaurant. Even so, he may be slightly less confident of finding Damon there
than he would be if he knew Damon was a rule-following promise keeper. Pythias may
therefore lose some pleasure of anticipation. It seems to me that this slight loss in pleasure
from anticipation (or, more generally, slight loss of confidence in one's predictions about
one's own future) is likely to be outweighed by the case-by-case advantages that come from
breaking promises when act utilitarianism says we should.
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paragraph is just the puzzle of whether act utilitarians can move themselves
from one such equilibrium to another by exchanging words, that is, by
promising. Once we have got to this point, I think it is clear what we
should say: it is an empirical question whether any particular group of
act utilitarians have available to them a mechanism for moving between
different equilibria of expectations; but since the expectations at both
equilibria are completely act utilitarian, there is no logical reason why
they should not possess such a mechanism.8
Earlier, I left a loose end, the question, Do I put too much weight
on how promising works between friends or between people who at least
have special reasons for mutual trust? As Harsanyi suggests, promises
may be made in situations ranging from casual arrangements between
friends to impersonal commercial dealings. Perhaps the act utilitarian's
account of promising does not make promissory obligation firm enough
to be relied on in trade or banking, at the other end of the spectrum
from Damon and Pythias.
For present purposes, there are two principal differences between
commercial transactions and dealings between friends. The less important
difference is this: in a society in which the distribution of wealth does
not conform to utilitarian principles, even a highly moral act utilitarian
might sometimes attempt to secure a benefit for himself or another, in
commerce, by an executory promise (a promise to be fulfilled at some
future time) that he had no intention of fulfilling. This would not happen
at all in a society organized completely according to utilitarian principles
(nor, I assume, between friends in any society). It might happen, as I
have said, in a society with a nonutilitarian distribution of wealth, but
even here it would not happen often, for the simple reason that act
utilitarians could not get away with this behavior very often without
depriving themselves of the useful possibility of making promises they
intended to keep.9
The much more important difference between commercial dealings
and dealings between friends is this: if Damon is a good act utilitarian,
then Pythias knows it. But Damon's banker, or Sears, Roebuck, or a
supplier of raw materials to Damon's small business, does not know it.
How, then, shall these commercial parties rely on Damon's promise?
There is a problem here, but it does not arise from Damon's being
an act utilitarian. If Damon were instead a punctilious commonsense
moral philosopher, who hardly ever broke a promise, how would Sears,
Roebuck know it? They wouldn't. If commercial parties rely significantly
on Damon's promises, it will normally be for one or more of the following
reasons: (1) Damon deals repeatedly with a single promisee and thus has
8. For a parallel discussion, see Regan, pp. 32-43.
9. For my response to the argument that act utilitarians would be unable to take
account of this loss of credibility because no individual false promise would have enough
bad effects on act utilitarians' general credibility, see ibid., p. 67 and chap. 3.
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a reputation to keep up. (2) Damon deals repeatedly with a class of
promisees, of whom the particular promisee is one, who exchange information, so that Damon has a reputation to keep up. Or, (3) Damon's
promise will be legally enforceable. All three of these reasons can apply
even if Damon is an act utilitarian. (An act utilitarian can be bound by,
and in certain contexts he can even support, laws that impose obligations
without fully act-utilitarian excusing conditions. Of course, such laws
would have greatly diminished importance in a society organized on
thoroughly utilitarian principles.) With regard to relatively trivial transactions, commercial dealers may rely to some extent on the fact that most
people keep most of their promises most of the time. But, as we have
seen, that also will be true even of act utilitarians.
I hope I will not be taken as arguing that act utilitarianism and rule
utilitarianism are really the same. I agree fully with Harsanyi that these
are different theories, and I agree with him about what some of the
differences are,1"for all that I disagree with his claims about promising
and similar institutions. Also, nothing I say here in defense of act utilitarianism should be taken to indicate a retreat from my belief that cooperative utilitarianism" is a better theory than either act or rule utilitarianism.
A CODA ON COORDINATION
One matter on which Harsanyi and I disagree fundamentally is the
importance and complexity of the coordination problem. He dismisses
the coordination problem as unimportant, and he thinks that in any
event it is easy to show that rule utilitarianism does better than act utilitarianism at promoting coordination (n. 5 and sec. 5). I think he is
mistaken on both counts, and I think both mistakes have a common
source. Harsanyi gives an incomplete answer to a question that has long
been recognized as one of the main stumbling blocks for rule utilitarianism:
granted that it would be best if everyone followed rule utilitarianism,
what should I do if some people do not follow it?
I do not suggest that Harsanyi overlooks this question. He addresses
it both in his essay "Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory" and in his
present essay. In "Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory" it is partly
the recognition that some people will not follow whatever moral theory
we decide is best that prompts Harsanyi's distinction between "flexible"
and "rigid" agents.12 If we adopt rule utilitarianism, then the flexible
agents are rule utilitarians, and each flexible agent selects and acts on
the best joint strategy for all flexible agents given the behavior of the
rigid agents. In the present essay, the flexible agents are in effect the
10. Subject to what I say below in the Coda to this response, I agree with essentially
everything in Harsanyi, "Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory," about the coordination
effect (in Harsanyi's sense, i.e., as distinguished from the expectation and incentive effects).
1 1. Regan, chaps. 8-10.
12. Harsanyi, "Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory," pp. 34-35, 46-48.
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people Harsanyi refers to as "all rational and morally motivated people"
when he says the best code is the code that would maximize expected
social utility when followed by those people (p. 44).
So far so good. But there is a further problem. How is one flexible
agent to identify the other flexible agents? This is important since the
best thing for the flexible agents to do may depend on how many of
them there are. As far as I can see, Harsanyi just takes it for granted in
is flexible and
both his essays that everyone knows who is who-who
who is not."3 But the individual agent making a moral decision in the
way Harsanyi recommends (if he does not jump over the whole process
and simply assume that his society's existing moral code is the right one)
must decide for himself who is flexible and who is not. As a practical
matter, he will not do this before every decision, but the question does
arise in principle in connection with any decision.
This creates a further problem. Suppose we accept tentatively that
the best theory for the flexible agents to follow is rule utilitarianism. The
first thing an individual rule utilitarian must do, then, is to figure out
who else is a rule utilitarian. Note that this must be the precise question
he asks about other agents. No more general inquiry will do. It will not
suffice, for example, to figure out who else is a person of good will in
some broad sense, such as, who is rational by ordinary commonsense
standards and generally benevolent. The reason is that somebody might
be rational by ordinary commonsense standards and generally benevolent
and still be an act utilitarian, a follower of W. D. Ross, or a believer in
some religious ethical code. But the rule utilitarian cannot count on such
people to join him in selecting and applying the best joint strategy for
him and them (as flexible agents), given the behavior of everyone else
(say, the egoists and people of unusually weak will).
So, the first thing the individual rule utilitarian must do is identify
the other rule utilitarians. But that means that the instructions to him
are in fact a bit more complicated than merely, "Be a rule utilitarian."
They are, "First figure out who the rule utilitarians are; then be a rule
utilitarian." And, of course, it is important that the people the individual
proposes to coordinate with (the other flexible agents) are also going
through the same preliminary step, lest theymake some false assumption
about who is a rule utilitarian and is therefore flexible in the required
sense.
If we call ordinary rule utilitarianism R, we have seen that the individual
cannot merely follow R. He must follow R', which says, "Figure out who
13. Perhaps what Harsanyi takes for granted is not that everyone knows who's who
but, rather, that every flexible agent has expectations about who should be treated as
flexible and who should be treated as rigid (see Harsanyi, "Rule Utilitarianism and Decision
Theory," p. 47). In some contexts it would matter whether one assumed knowledge or only
expectations, but I don't think it does for present purposes, since what I go on to discuss
in the text is the question how the relevant expectations could rationally be formed and
indeed whether there is any way they could be rationally formed.
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else is following R; then follow R with them." Or rather, since the others
must also go through the preliminary step, what R' must actually say is,
"Figure out who else is following R'; then follow R with them." Unfortunately, the instructions that are supposed to constitute R' now contain
within them a reference to R'. Can this self-reference be avoided? Can
we spell out what the individual agent must do, including what he must
do to identify the other agents it is sensible for him to try to coordinate
with, in such a way that there is no vicious regress?
It was in demonstrating that we can provide an appropriate set of
instructions, at least in principle, that I produced two very convoluted
chapters in my book, which assume what Harsanyi correctly characterizes
as "completely unreal conditions" (n. 5). I still regard it as worthwhile to
have shown that the problem is solvable in principle. Harsanyi may of
course disagree. In any event, those chapters were the best I could do
by way of dealing with what we might call the "identification problem"the problem of how to build into our instructions to an individual who
wants to cooperate the essential first step of deciding who else is cooperating.
That is a genuine problem, which I believe Harsanyi does not address.
Although Harsanyi does not address this problem, I said in Utilitarianism and Co-operationthat he had come closer to addressing it than
anyone before him,14 and I meant that to be a favorable comment. The
lucidity of his discussion of the coordination problem, rescinding from
the identification problem, highlighted much better than any previous
discussion just what remained to be done. However, I went on to do
Harsanyi an injustice by treating him as if he also meant to deal with
the identification problem. Assuming (falsely, I now believe) that he
meant to address the identification problem (and to solve it by identifying
the rigid agents with those whose behavior could be predicted), I attempted
to explain briefly why his suggestions did not solve the problem (hardly
surprising, if he was not trying to). In the process I made some arguments
that are misguided and unjust if they are taken as criticisms of Harsanyi's
treatment of the coordination problem (identification aside).15 I apologize.
To return very briefly to my observations at the beginning of this
coda, I suspect there are two reasons why I regard the coordination
problem as more important than Harsanyi does. One reason is that,
treating the identification problem as part of the coordination problem,
I see many more tacit coordination problems than he does.16 Voting and
tax paying, indeed all matters involving obedience or disobedience to
some general statute or regulation, present coordination problems that
are "tacit" in the sense that they are not fully solved even by explicit
agreement or legislation. In principle, the identification problem always
remains. It is simply not susceptible of solution by fiat, whether it be the
14. Regan, p. 260, n. 7.
15. Ibid.
16. He says they are "rather rare and unimportant" (p. 48).
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fiat of agreeing parties or the fiat of a legislator. Even in the simplest
case, where two parties have made a face-to-face agreement, the question
remains for each, Will the other follow it? In that sense, every coordination
problem has an ineliminable tacit aspect.17
The other reason I think the coordination problem is more important
than Harsanyi does is that I do not think the coordination effect and the
expectation and incentive effects can be separated as completely as Harsanyi
tries to separate them. Believing that act utilitarians can influence expectations and incentives by behavior such as promising, I also believe
that for act utilitarians the problem of generating desirable expectations
and incentives is itself a coordination problem and an important one.
Moreover, if non-rule utilitarians must identify rule utilitarians and infer
what rule utilitarians really believe at least in part from the rule utilitarians'
behavior,then it seems to me that the problem of generating expectations
and incentives is a coordination problem for rule utilitarians also.

17. I mention the problem of obedience to statutory and regulatory schemes only
because almost every such scheme points to some coordination problem. It might seem
that coordination is guaranteed in such cases without any specific thought by any individual
of the desirability of coordination, since each individual is given adequate incentives for
correct behavior by the threat of legal penalties. But the law could not function in the face
of really widespread disobedience. The majority of people keep the system going by cooperating in obedience; and the penalties deter the remainder (insofar as they are effective).
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